Institutional factors in the form of direct democracy (via initiatives and referenda) and federal structure (local autonomy) systematically and sizeably raise self-reported individual well-being in a cross-regional econometric analysis. This positive effect can be attributed to political outcomes closer to voters' preferences, as well as to the procedural utility of political participation possibilities. Moreover, the results of previous microeconometric well-being functions for other countries are generally supported. Unemployment has a strongly depressing effect on happiness. A higher income level raises happiness, however, only to a small extent.
Institutional factors in the form of direct democracy (via initiatives and referenda) and federal structure (local autonomy) systematically and sizeably raise self-reported individual well-being in a cross-regional econometric analysis. This positive effect can be attributed to political outcomes closer to voters' preferences, as well as to the procedural utility of political participation possibilities. Moreover, the results of previous microeconometric well-being functions for other countries are generally supported. Unemployment has a strongly depressing effect on happiness. A higher income level raises happiness, however, only to a small extent.
To discover the sources of people's well-being is a major concern in the social sciences. Many inquiries have been undertaken to identify the determinants of individual happiness. This paper analyses data on reported subjective wellbeing in order to directly assess the role of democratic and federal institutions on people's satisfaction with life. Thus, a new set of determinants is considered, which expands previous research results showing the effects on happiness of individual income and unemployment, as well as of aggregate unemployment, in¯ation and income growth (see Oswald, (1997) for a survey). 1 We argue that institutional conditions with regard to the extent and form of democracy have systematic and sizeable effects on individual well-being, in addition to demographic and economic factors. Using recent interview data from 6,000 residents of Switzerland, we show that individuals are ceteris paribus happier, the better developed the institutions of direct democracy are in their area of residence. This also applies to a second institution, the degree of government decentralisation (federalism). Finally, we are able to support some of the earlier results for other countries and periods with new data also based on a survey with a large sample size. In particular, we ®nd that the unemployed are much less happy than employed persons, and that a higher household income level only raises happiness to a small extent.
Determinants of Happiness
It is useful to differentiate three sets of sources of individual well-being:
(1) Personality and demographic factors. These factors have for many decades been extensively studied by psychologists. Diener et al. (1999) provide a survey, extending and bringing up to date the earlier surveys by Wilson (1967) and Diener (1984) . Monographs are by Argyle (1987) and Myers (1993) .
(2) Micro-and macroeconomic factors. An early study of the effect of income on happiness is due to Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , see also 1995 , but psychologists have also undertaken substantial work in this direction (see the survey by Diener and Oishi, 2000) . In most nations, individuals belonging to the upper income groups report somewhat higher subjective well-being than persons with low income. The often dramatic increase in per capita incomes in recent decades has not raised happiness in general; the national indices for subjective wellbeing have virtually remained¯at over time (see Blanch¯ower and Oswald, 2000) . In contrast to these longitudinal ®ndings for single nations, per capita income levels and happiness are more strongly positively related across nations (for further discussion see also Kenny, 1999) .
The in¯uence of the other two major economic variables, unemployment and in¯ation, is clear-cut. Unemployment is correlated with substantial unhappiness (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) . As the income level is kept constant, that in¯uence is not due to lower revenue, but to non-pecuniary stress. In terms of a trade-off,`most regression results imply that an enormous amount of extra income would be required to compensate people for having no work' (Oswald, 1997 (Oswald, , p. 1821 . Individuals also have a strong aversion towards in¯ation and are prepared to carry signi®cant cost to evade it:`one percentage point of in¯ation corresponds to a well-being cost of approximately two per cent of the level of income per capita' (Di Tella et al. 1997, p. 18 ).
(
3) The third set of in¯uences on happiness relates to the institutional (or constitutional) conditions in an economy and society, of which democracy and federalism are of greatest importance. To our knowledge, the impact of the extent and design of democratic and federal institutions on subjective wellbeing has, at best, been alluded to, but has not been empirically analysed.
The determinants of happiness are usually investigated under the assumptions that subjective well-being is cardinally measurable and interpersonally 2 These results provide welcome and important insights into a broader effort to measure empirically individuals' reaction to, and therewith evaluation of, the in¯uence of macro-economic variables. Other approaches are (see more extensively Frey (1991) ): (i) retreat from society, or at least from the of®cial economy, e.g. by working in the shadow sector (e.g. Cowell, 1990; Thomas, 1992) ; (ii) popularity and election functions (surveys are given e.g. in Nannestad and Paldam (1994) , Schneider and Frey (1988) ); (iii) political preference functions derived from the behaviour of governments and central banks (see the survey and critique in Makin (1976) ); (iv) non-conventional political participation ranging from demonstrations to publicly motivated strikes (see e.g. Hibbs, 1976; Opp, 1989); and (v) use of force, i.e. all sorts of revolutions and coups d'e Âtat (e.g. Hibbs, 1973; Opp et al., 1995) . The wellbeing functions, together with popularity and election functions, belong to the best de®ned and statistically most advanced efforts to measure the absolute and relative importance of macro-economic conditions for individuals. comparable; i.e. two claims economists are likely to be sceptical about. To avoid problems in regard to a cardinal interpretation of subjective variables, it is often possible to treat the subjective data qualitatively in econometric analyses. In contrast, whether people associate the same degree of subjective experience with a certain score on a ladder for life satisfaction is more dif®cult to assess. However, there is a lot of indirect evidence that cardinalism and interpersonal comparability are much less of a problem practically than theoretically. The measures of subjective well-being have high consistency, reliability and validity. Happy people are e.g. more often smiling during social interactions (Ferna Ândez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1995) , are rated as happy by friends and family members (Sandvik et al., 1993) , as well as by spouses (Costa and McCrae, 1988) . Furthermore, the measures of subjective well-being have a high degree of stability over time (Headey and Wearing, 1989) and are not systematically biased with regard to social desirability (Konow and Earley, 1999) . But there is, of course, room for methodological concerns (e.g. Diener et al., 1999, pp. 277±8) . Moreover, as will be demonstrated in this paper, the main use of happiness measures is not to compare levels, but rather to seek to identify the determinants of happiness.
Effects of Institutions on Happiness
Most political institutions tend to be stable over time, so that a cross-sectional analysis of subjective well-being is appropriate. This has been done between countries (e.g. by Veenhoven (1993) on the basis of the World Values Survey, and by Diener et al., (1995) ).
3 It is, of course, dif®cult to isolate the effect of particular institutions on reported individual well-being because the countries differ in a great variety of aspects. This problem is less acute for institutional variations within a (federal) country. Therefore, we study the case of Switzerland and its institutions of direct democracy. Their wide dissemination is unique for a European country. As far as we know, this is the ®rst paper using cross-regional variations in a happiness study. Cross-regional procedures have been used with good results to account for the share of government expenditures between governmental units with different degrees of direct participation possibilities for its citizens (as done for the United States, 4 as well as for Switzerland 5 ). There are two major reasons why a higher extent of direct political participation possibilities, or more strongly developed institutions of direct democracy (in 3 The study of institutional differences is methodologically closely related to cross-country growth analysis (see e.g. Barro, 1997) . However, this literature has not yet been incorporated into happiness research. There is also a relation to well-being measurement in research on economic development. Dasgupta (1993) , for example, provides a measure of well-being that includes standard of living as well as indices of political and civil liberties.
4 See e.g. Matsusaka (1995) or Rueben (2000) for general government expenditure, or Santerre (1989; for public education expenditures.
5 See e.g. Schneider and Pommerehne (1983) and Feld and Kirchga Èssner (1999) for general government expenditures. The latter also study the effect on self-®nancing ratios, taxes, and debt. Pommerehne and Weck (1996) and Frey (1997) analyse the effect on tax evasion, and Feld and Savioz (1997) on per capita gross domestic product.
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particular via popular referenda and initiatives) can be expected to raise citizens' subjective well-being (Cronin (1989) , Budge (1996) or for an economic analysis Frey (1994) ). Firstly, due to the more active role of the citizens, (professional) politicians are better monitored and controlled. Government activity, i.e. public outlays as well as the many other decisions by the government, are closer to the wishes of the citizenry. 6 As a consequence, satisfaction with government output is re¯ected in a higher level of overall well-being.
Secondly, the institutions of direct democracy extend the citizens' possibilities to get involved in the political process. Experimental evidence (e.g. Tyler, 1990; Bohnet and Frey, 1999) suggests that this procedural effect is independent of the outcome of the political activity itself.
Federal decentralisation, and, in particular, local autonomy, is another constitutional element which can be hypothesised to positively affect citizens' happiness. Political decision making in municipalities is closer to relevant information about residents' preferences and also closer to direct control by its citizens (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999) .
Data for Econometric Analysis
Our empirical work is based on the survey results of more than 6,000 residents of Switzerland, collected by Leu et al. (1997) . 7 The dependent variable called happiness' is based on the answers to the following question:`How satis®ed are you with your life as a whole these days?' Simultaneously, the respondents were shown a table with a 10 point scale of which only the two extreme values (`completely dissatis®ed' and`completely satis®ed') were verbalised. The survey found a high general life satisfaction in Switzerland with an average of 8.2 out of 10 points. No fewer than 29% of the interviewees reported a satisfaction level of 10 (`completely satis®ed'), 17% of 9, and 27% of 8. The lower end of the happiness-scale,`completely dissatis®ed' (score 1), score 2 and score 3, were indicated only by 0.4%, 0.5%, and 0.9%, respectively. As these categories of great unhappiness are thinly populated, they are aggregated, leaving us with eight happiness categories. 8 In this paper, the major explanatory variable focused on is the institutionalised rights of individual political participation, which vary considerably between the 26 Swiss cantons. Due to the federal structure of Switzerland, major areas of competence are kept by the cantons (states). As on the national level, there exist direct democratic instruments besides representative democratic parliaments and governments. The most important direct democratic instruments in cantons are the popular initiative to change the canton's constitution 6 This statement is supported by considerable empirical (econometric) evidence, e.g. Pommerehne (1978; ) or Gerber (1999 . 7 The survey data were collected between 1992 and 1994 in order to investigate the problem of poverty in Switzerland. The information contained in the data set is based on personal interviews and tax statistics. 8 The regrouping of the lowest categories does not change the qualitative results.
or laws, a compulsory and optional referendum to prevent new laws, or the changing of existing laws, and optional ®nancial referenda to prevent new state expenditure. Citizens' access to these instruments differ from canton to canton. Thus, for example, the number of signatures required to launch an initiative or an optional referendum, or the time span within which the signatures have to be collected, varies. The referendum on public expenditures may be launched at different levels of additional outlays. For the 26 cantons, we constructed an index designed to re¯ect the extent of direct democratic participation possibilities (for details of the index construction, see the Appendix). This index is de®ned using a six point scale with 1 indicating the lowest, and 6 the highest degree of participation possibilities for the citizens. Fig. 1 provides an overview. The purpose of our estimate is to show that the extent of direct democratic participation possibilities exerts a statistically signi®cant, robust and sizeable effect on happiness over and above the demographic and economic determinants so far taken into account in the literature.
We also intend to demonstrate that institutional factors are relevant for happiness in general by analysing the impact of federalism. The division of competence between communities and the cantonal government re¯ects the federal structure of a canton or, from the municipalities' point of view, their autonomy. The extent of local autonomy is measured by an index (due to Ladner, 1994) . The index over the 26 cantons is based on survey results. Chief local administrators in 1856 Swiss municipalities were asked to report how they perceive their local autonomy on a 10 point scale, with one indicating`no autonomy at all', and 10`very high' communal autonomy. The estimation equations regress the indices of individual happiness on three sets of determinants:
(1) Demographic variables They describe the personal attributes of the respondents and comprise · age. Six age groups are explicitly accounted for, ranging from 30 years to 80 years and older (the constant term includes the reference group`people younger than 30');
· gender (male/female); · citizenship (national/foreigner); · extent of formal education (middle/high education) (in the reference group are`people with low education');
· family setting (single woman or man; couple with children; single parent, other, collective household) (in the reference group are`couples') and · individual employment status (self-employed or employee in one's own ®rm; housewife or houseman; other) (in the reference group are`employed persons').
(2) Economic variables Two in¯uences are considered:
· Individual unemployment (the constant term includes the reference group`employed persons');
· Income situation of the household (equivalence income). Total household income after taxes, social security expenditure, interest on debts and maintenance is divided through the equivalence scale of the Swiss Conference for Public Assistance. Four income groups are explicitly distinguished, ranging from Sfr. 2,000 to Sfr. 5,000 per month and more (in the reference group arè people with a lower equivalence income than Sfr. 2,000').
The above two sets of variables are used as controls.
9 While they are of obvious interest in themselves, they mainly serve to isolate the unbiased in¯uence of the third set of variables.
(3) Political institutions The variables included in the estimation models are · an index for direct democratic rights and · an index for the extent of local (communal) autonomy.
The latter variables refer to the 26 cantons in Switzerland. The structure of Swiss cantons, however, does not only differ in respect of direct democracy and federal organisation, but also in other respects, such as the degree of urbanisation. Therefore, to control for further regional differences, we include ®ve variables for the size of community and seven variables for the type of community in the estimation equations.
Results and Discussion of the Econometric Analysis
We present the results of our econometric analysis in seven separate sections. In Sections 4.1 to 4.4, we discuss the effects of the three sets of demographic, economic and institutional variables on happiness. In Section 4.5 we perform several tests of robustness. Finally, Sections 4.6 and 4.7 indicate who bene®ts from direct democracy and that the bene®ts can be attributed to a favourable outcome as well as to a favourable direct democratic process itself. Table 1 presents the estimated coef®cients and marginal effects of two microeconometric happiness functions, taking into account demographic and economic determinants as well as the institutional variable direct democratic rights. In the ®rst equation, a weighted least squares model is estimated. In the second one, a weighted ordered probit model is used in order to exploit the ranking information contained in the originally scaled dependent variable. The weighting variable that is applied allows representative results on the subject level for Switzerland.
Microeconometric Happiness Functions
10 Throughout the paper, we use a robust estimator of variance because random disturbances are potentially correlated within groups or clusters. Here, dependence refers to residents of the same canton.
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The estimation results show statistically signi®cant effects of several demographic factors, all the economic variables and, most importantly, the institutional determinant on individual happiness. The least squares estimation that treats happiness as a cardinal variable offers qualitatively very similar results to the ordered probit model, i.e the results are robust in regard to the estimation method. The coef®cients of the former model can be interpreted in a simple way: people belonging to a certain category on average report happiness scores deviating from that of the reference group on the scale of the coef®cient.
happiness greater than or equal to any given level increases. The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of persons belonging to a stated happiness level when the independent variable increases by one unit. 13 In the case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is evaluated in regard to the reference group. For simplicity, only the marginal effects for the extreme value of very high happiness (score 10) are shown in Table 1 . (For example, being unemployed rather than employed lowers the probability of a person stating that he or she is completely satis®ed by 21.1 percentage points.)
Demographic and Economic Factors of Life Satisfaction
Compared to the reference group, people older than 60 are happier. Women are not happier than men if the different employment status is considered separately. Furthermore, foreigners are subject to a signi®cantly lower probability of reaching high happiness scores compared to the Swiss. People with higher education report signi®cantly higher subjective well-being. Couples without children are happier than singles, single parents and people living in collective households.
Among the economic variables, higher income correlates with higher happiness in a statistically signi®cant way. However, the differences in subjective well-being are rather small. Consider, for example, the highest income group with a monthly equivalence income above Sfr. 5,000. Compared to persons with low income, only a 6.8 percentage points larger share reports being completely satis®ed'. As already alluded to above, unemployment has a very large negative in¯uence on individual well-being. The coef®cient of this variable is largest in comparison to the other signi®cant coef®cients mentioned.
The demographic and economic variables in the happiness equation thus yield very similar results for Swiss data as were previously found by Blanchower and Oswald (2000) and Di Tella et al. (1997) for other countries, in particular the highly signi®cant and large negative effect of being unemployed, and the small positive effect of income. 14 4.3. The Effect of Direct Democracy on Subjective Well-being Table 1 also shows the results for one of the institutional variables. The index for direct democratic rights has a highly signi®cant positive effect on happiness. An increase in the index of direct democracy by one point raises the share of persons indicating very high satisfaction with life by 2.8 percentage points. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the institutions of direct democracy raise the reported subjective well-being. In addition, the 13 Alternatively, the marginal effect indicates the change of the probability belonging to a stated happiness level when the independent variable increases by one unit.
14 Part of the correlation observed can, of course, be explained by reverse causation. For happy people, it is easier to ®nd a partner. They probably less often lose their job and get jobs where they earn more money. effect itself is sizeable: (i) The marginal effect of direct democratic rights on happiness is as large as the effect of living in the second-bottom (Sfr. 2,000-3,000) instead of the bottom income category (, Sfr. 2,000). (ii) The effect is even larger when the full range of the institutional variable is considered, i.e. when individuals in canton Basel Land (with the highest democracy index of 5.69) are compared to citizens in canton Geneva (with the lowest direct participation rights of 1.75). The former state with an 11 percentage points higher probability that they are completely satis®ed. (iii) The improvement affects everybody, i.e. the institutional factor is important in an aggregate sense. In comparison, getting a job`only' raises the subjective well-being of the unemployed.
Do happy people choose direct democratic institutions? Or, in other words, does the causality between direct democracy and subjective well-being work in reverse? Direct democratic participation possibilities, in the form of referenda and initiatives in Switzerland, started to develop in the middle of the 19 th century. The adoption of some of the instruments of direct popular participation re¯ects the spread of the spirit and ideas behind the American and the French revolutions. Equally important were political movements within the citizenry. Citizens fought for direct democratic instruments to gain political power against arbitrary decisions by parliaments and the in¯uence of industrial pressure groups on these authorities in the cantons (see e.g. Ko Èlz, 1998). This historic perspective suggests that the democratic institutions are not simply the result of happy and satis®ed citizens. Especially during recent decades, institutional conditions in Swiss cantons have been quite stable, 15 which suggests that causality runs unambiguously from direct democratic rights to satisfaction with life. Table 2 focuses on federalism in the sense of`devolution' as a second important political institution hypothesised to raise happiness. Therefore, the 15 The Spearman rank order correlation of the index for direct democratic rights between 1970 and 1996 is 0.803. Notes : see Table 1 . Data sources : Ladner (1994) and Leu et al. (1997) .
The Effect of Federalism on Happiness
variable`local autonomy' is added to the demographic and economic factors in the happiness equation. (For simplicity, only the coef®cients for variables of interest are shown. However, they indicate the partial effects controlling for the demographic and economic variables included in Table 1 . Moreover, the coef®cients of the latter variables are almost unaltered.
16 ) The estimate reveals a statistically signi®cant positive effect on subjective well-being. For local autonomy, the proportion of persons indicating very high happiness increases by 3.3 percentage points, compared to a situation in which the communes are one index point less autonomous vis-a Á-vis their canton.
Local autonomy and direct democracy are not independent of each other, of course. On the one hand, direct democracy fosters federal structures on the national and state level because citizens ± in contrast to politicians ± are most interested in strong federalism (Blankart, 1998) . On the other hand, the persons bearing the costs and bene®ts of government action are better identi®able in a decentralised system. Direct legislation, therefore, leads to better political decisions, and federalism thus preserves direct democracy. As a result, the indices for direct democratic rights and local autonomy are correlated (r 0.605). This makes it impossible to separate the effects of the two variables in one model clearly. The second equation in Table 2 jointly includes the two constitutional factors, local autonomy and direct democratic rights. The coef®cient for the variable measuring federalism is roughly one third as large as when it is taken alone and it loses its signi®cance. The index for direct democracy has only a slightly smaller marginal effect on life satisfaction than estimated in Table 1 , namely 0.024 instead of 0.028.
17 Direct democracy and federalism in Switzerland thus seem to be complements rather than economic substitutes. Local autonomy is one of the several`transmission mechanisms' of direct democracy's bene®cial effects. In the following paragraphs, we therefore focus on direct democracy.
Sensitivity Analysis
To check the reliability of the results, several tests of robustness are performed: (i) the in¯uence of outliers is analysed with a DFBETA-test; (ii) an ordinal measure instead of a cardinal one is applied for the extent of direct democratic rights; (iii) the effect of the four sub-indices on happiness is tested; and ®nally (iv) four different aggregate control variables are used.
To investigate whether the positive correlation between direct democracy and happiness is largely driven by a single canton, a DFBETA-test is performed. A two-step approach is chosen. In the ®rst step, a further weighted ordered probit model with a dummy variable for each canton is estimated. In preparation for the second step, the estimated coef®cients are correlated with the index for direct democratic rights. Due to the problem of heteroskedasticity, a weighted least square regression is estimated. 18 The result is as follows ( Ticino. 20 This shows that the positive effect of direct democracy on happiness is not the result of an in¯uential outlier.
The measure applied for the extent of direct democratic participation possibilities is constructed as a cardinal index. However, the same results should be obtained if ordinal dummy variables for direct democratic rights are constructed. To test this claim, cantons were classi®ed into three groups: cantons with an index score lower than four have low direct democratic rights, cantons with an index between four and ®ve have medium direct democratic rights, and cantons with an index score above ®ve are ranked highly with respect to direct democratic rights. The two dummy variables for cantons with a medium and a high ranking are included in the estimation equation presented in Table 3 . As can be seen, satisfaction with life is higher for people living in cantons with medium and high direct democratic rights. The signi®-cant coef®cient for the top category is 0.179. (In the reference group are people who live in cantons with low direct democratic rights).
The variable for direct democratic participation possibilities is a nonweighted composite index (see Appendix). This aggregation disregards various substitutive and complementary relationships between the single components of the index. Nevertheless, the components can be evaluated by themselves.
18 Heteroskedasticity arises because the coef®cients for the canton's dummy variables are based on samples with largely different size. Therefore, the weighting variable contains the number of observations per canton. 19 The results for ordinary least squares are as follows:
fixed effects for cantons À0X402 Ã (À2X277) 0X125 ÃÃ (3X104) 3 index for direct democratic rights, with adjusted R 2 0.257. 20 If the ®xed effect of this canton is omitted, the coef®cient for direct democratic rights increases to 0.100. However, the analysis faces the problem of multicorrelation.
21 Therefore, the in¯uence of each component is evaluated separately (see Table 3 ).
All four sub-indices of direct democratic rights have a signi®cantly positive effect on reported subjective well-being. The coef®cients for the two sub-indices for the right to change the canton's law or the canton's constitution with a legislative or constitutional popular initiative are largest. Thus, the possibility of putting new questions on the political agenda is of special importance for the bene®cial effects of direct democracy on citizens individual well-being.
In order to test for alternative explanations of the cross-regional differences in happiness, the effect of some aggregate control variables is estimated on its own as well as jointly with the institutional variable. Table 4 exhibits the results for the two macroeconomic variables`national income per capita' and`total tax burden', as well as for the two language variables`French speaking canton' and`Italian speaking canton'. Equations (1) and (2) indicate that national income per capita does not in¯uence happiness signi®cantly, whether it is controlled for institutional differences or not. The same holds for the variable total tax burden in (3) and (4). As can be seen, the introduction of these two macroeconomic variables does not (much) affect the size and signi®cance of the direct democracy variable. In contrast, the variables for majority language are signi®cantly correlated with reported satisfaction with life, i.e. living in a French speaking canton means signi®cantly lower happiness, whereas living in the Italian speaking canton Ticino means signi®cantly higher reported sub- Notes : see Table 1 . Coef®cients with signi®cance levels. t-values in parentheses. In the reference group in (1) are cantons with direct democratic rights lower than 4. Data sources : Leu et al. (1997) . 21 The correlation between the four sub-indices is shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
[ O C T O B E R T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L
jective well-being (5). However, the lower well-being in the French speaking cantons can to a large extent be explained by weaker direct democratic rights (6). In (6) the coef®cient of the institutional variable is almost unchanged and still signi®cant (p , 0.05). It can be concluded that the extent of direct democracy has a robust in¯uence on happiness.
Who Bene®ts from Direct Democracy?
Are the bene®cial effects of direct democracy restricted to some privileged groups? To investigate this important question of equality, we analyse the in¯uence of direct democracy for groups of persons sharing common characteristics in regard to sex, education, employment status and income. Technically, interaction variables are included in the estimation equation, in addition to the demographic and economic variables. The interaction variables are the product of dummy variables for the personal characteristics and the index for direct democratic rights. The bene®ts of direct democracy reaped by women are smaller than for men. However, the difference is not statistically signi®cant. There is also no signi®cant difference between the three levels of education and the ®ve categories of employment status distinguished, i.e. the positive effect of direct democracy does not arise with the education classes and is not bound to a certain employment status. We have also analysed whether direct democracy raises the happiness of high income recipients, while not doing so for low income recipients. However, the interaction variables do not show any statistically signi®cant differences. The positive effect of direct democracy on happiness applies to all income classes, and is not restricted to a particular one. Overall, our analysis indicates that direct democracy is not used to discriminate against certain groups within society. The bene®ts are distributed rather evenly among social classes. However, as in other countries, a large proportion of residents is formally excluded from participation in the direct democratic process, namely foreigners. In the next paragraph, it is argued that they can reap only part of the utility derived from direct democracy. 4.7. Direct Democracy and Procedural Utility Do citizens derive procedural utility from the possibility of participating in the directly democratic process? To answer this question, it is crucial to note that political participation in initiatives and referenda is restricted to Swiss nationals; only they can reap the respective procedural utility. Foreigners, in contrast, have in general no political participation rights. However, they cannot be discriminated from the favourable outcome of direct democracy (outcome utility). As foreigners cannot reap procedural utility from political participation, they are hypothesised to gain less from direct democracy than Swiss citizens. This can be tested either by considering an interaction effect between direct democracy and being a foreigner or by running separate equations for foreigners and Swiss. 22 The results for the latter test are shown in Table 5 . 23 In both equations, direct democratic rights have a positive effect on reported subjective well-being. However, a direct comparison of the two coef®-cients for direct democratic rights suggests that foreigners bene®t less than Swiss citizens in cantons in which the institutions of direct democracy are well 22 Two separate regressions allow different coef®cients for the control variables of the sample for foreigners and for Swiss citizens and thus foster the ceteris paribus interpretation of the results of the institutional variable. 23 The results for the former test (a weighted ordered probit estimation with clustering in cantons) are as follows: satisfaction with life F F F À0X042 (À0X283) being a foreigner F F F 0X097 ÃÃ 3X384
3 index for direct democratic rights À0X067
developed. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Swiss majority in more directly democratic cantons uses its institutional possibilities to exploit the minority of foreigners. The size of the procedural utility gained from being able to participate in the direct democratic process can also be assessed. Comparing the positive marginal effect for direct democracy of 3.4 percentage points for Swiss citizens with the marginal effect of 1.0 percentage points for foreigners suggests that two thirds of the gain in well-being is due to the application of a favourable process in political decision-making. 24 Procedural utility, over and above outcome utility, is an important source of satisfaction due to direct democracy.
An alternative interpretation of these results can be advanced on the basis of the missing variables problem. Assuming that foreigners and Swiss citizens are equally affected by unobserved regional factors, the causal effect of direct democratic rights on happiness is identi®ed by the difference in the coef®-cients for this variable between the two groups. 25 According to this interpretation, the marginal effect of direct democratic rights on subjective well-being is slightly smaller, namely 3.4 minus 1.0, i.e. 2.4 percentage points instead of 2.8 percentage points as estimated in Table 1 .
Conclusions
With data from interviews of more than 6,000 Swiss residents, we have adduced strong evidence that institutional (or constitutional) factors exert a systematic and sizeable positive in¯uence on reported happiness. The existence of Notes : see Table 1 . Data source : Leu et al. (1997) . 24 Quantitatively very similar results are obtained if interaction terms for direct democratic rights and being Swiss and being foreigner, respectively, are included in one equation instead of estimating two separate regressions. 25 This interpretation is analogous to the differences-in-differences estimator for time series as e.g. applied in Card (1990) . extended individual participation possibilities in the form of initiatives and referenda, and of decentralised (federal) government structures raises the subjective well-being of people.
The in¯uence of these political institutions on happiness is consistent with the hypothesis that politicians in a strongly developed direct democracy are forced to follow the preferences of the voters more than when direct popular participation rights are less well developed. Moreover, the citizens gain procedural utility from the fuller possibilities of directly participating in the political process. Foreigners living in Switzerland are more likely to bene®t from the outcome than from the process (from which they are excluded). We ®nd indeed that foreigners tend to reap systematically positive but lower satisfaction from living in a canton with strongly developed direct participation rights than do the Swiss.
These results, with respect to the institutional determinants of happiness, are obtained even if the`standard' determinants of happiness due to demographic and economic factors are controlled for, and a number of robustness checks are undertaken.
In consonance with other happiness studies, unemployment is associated with a considerably lower level of subjective well-being. A higher equivalence income has a statistically signi®cant positive but small effect on happiness.
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Each of these restrictions is evaluated on a six point scale:`one' indicates a high barrier,`six' a low one. From the resulting ratings, a non-weighted average is calculated for each instrument (i.e. four sub-indices) and for the composite index, which represents the measure of direct democratic rights in Swiss cantons. The results are presented in Table A1 .
The index for local autonomy is based on survey results by Ladner (1994) . Chief local administrators in 1856 Swiss municipalities reported how they perceive their local autonomy on a 10 point scale, with one indicating`no autonomy at all', and 10`very high' communal autonomy. Average scores for each canton are also shown in Table  A1 . Leu et al. (1997) .
